Speaker Thomas B. Reed, who broke molds. To pose a wider time envelope, a generation earlier offered the public leadership of, for example, Abraham Lincoln and Thaddeus Stevens, as well as Congress's striking override of its own standing committees during the Civil War and Reconstruction as ad hoc special committees decked with leading politicians and sensitive to crisis needs were crafted on the spot to handle much of the institution's major work (Mayhew 2000, 178, 180) . A generation after 1885 would come the presidential leadership of Theodore Roosevelt and Wilson himself.
Is this discussion a putdown of Wilson? No, it is not. Notwithstanding the complexities, he hit on a basic truth. He drew a picture of Congress, or at least the House of Representatives, as an arena of dispersed influence and deliberation. As one side-effect of this dispersion, a Gladstonian kind of crystallizing debate was not ordinarily to be found there. Peering through it all, the standing committees were fundamental units. For good reason, this was an arresting picture. It has served as an analytic template since. Among other things, it helped inject a discordant Anglophile model into the study of American institutions: "The British system is perfected party government," Wilson wrote (1981, 91) . As a focused presentation, Wilson's idea of Congress as an arena of dispersed influence and deliberation was novel. We do not see it in, for example, the country's earlier theoretical text, the Federalist.
As a political scientist, Wilson set a powerful example. Since his time, a good deal of scholarship about Congress-or, more broadly, about the complex of U.S. national institutions into which Congress fits-has borne a scientific stamp something like his. Highlighting-the urge to simplify, to reach for the basics and bypass the rest-has been much in evidence. But so has localism. Explanatory enterprises apt for their times have ordinarily sagged or faltered somewhat, albeit not to the limit of complete non-utility, when carried outside their times. That is the way the scholarship has gone.
I will discuss certain aspects of that scholarship here in these terms. Some of it has dwelt on Congress in isolation, some on the constellation of Congress and the presidency. My choice of authors or schools is selective-not, of course, anything like exhaustive. One of the analytic schools is partly my own. I organize the discussion under six rubrics, each of which has featured, in the Wilsonian sense, a claim.
Spatial dissonance
The mid-twentieth century brought a reprise of Wilson in the "responsible parties" school of analysis. Here again the ingredients included Anglophilia; a broad brush; a theme of lamentation; a blending of the normative with the positive; a juxtaposing of Congress to the presidency; and a boundless regard for party leadership. It was a fetching mix. The analysis had its epicenter around 1950, but its life spanned from the mid-1940s through the mid-1960s. In those days, political science was not as differentiated professionally as it later became. Leading authors could double as academics and public intellectuals. 5 One author I draw on here, Congressman Richard Bolling (1965, 1968) , was not an academic at all, yet his writing seems to fit into the responsible parties school more or less seamlessly. Otherwise, the main authors of the school included at least E. E. Schattschneider (1942, also a major author of Towarda More Responsible Two-party System, 1950 -henceforth APSA Report), Stephen K. Bailey (1950) , and James MacGregor Burns (1949, 1963) .
The responsible parties approach is ordinarily seen as normative, yet it was positive, too. Without a positive side, the school would likely have drawn little enthusiasm or notice. What was that positive side? As I see it, the writers were pitching an idea of spatial dissonance. I use "spatial" here in the dimensional sense that the term enjoys today. This usage is anachronistic: the authors back then did not use the term or have a developed sense of dimensions. But they did see an issue or policy space confronting American society that, looking back, with perhaps some squeezing, appears unidimensional. There was not a uniformity of labeling. A "coherent" or "nationwide" stance on policy matters as opposed to a sectional, localistic, or special-interest stance was one coding (Schattschneider 1942, 206-7 ; Bailey 1950, ix, 239; APSA Report 1950, 4, 33-4; Burns 1949, 42-3). Yet a coding of liberal versus conservative was often the formulation, too (Bailey 1950, xi, 75-7, ch. 5, ch. 7, 190-218; Burns 1963, 198, 199, 252; Bolling 1965, 71, 81, 91) . It all seems to have come down to more or less the same thing, at least on domestic matters. 6 With regard to this dimension, these authors argued that a dissonance of treatment and outcome inhered in the array of national institutions. Burns saw a "four-party system" in which the presidential Democrats operated at the liberal extreme, the congressional Republicans at the conservative extreme, and the congressional Democrats and presidential Republicans near the middle-"in general, though, both presidential parties [consider Dewey, Eisenhower] have been more liberal, and both congressional parties have been more conservative" (1963, 199) . Eisenhower, like the Democratic presidents in Burns' view, often pressed a reluctant Congress from the liberal side (Burns 1963, 192 Grofman, Griffin, and Glazer 1991). The responsible parties writers saw the dissonance across the three institutions-presidency, Senate, and House -as a major feature of the American system. Vexatious policy deadlock, or at least a good deal of grinding, frustration, and delay could result. As instances of unfortunate congressional foot-dragging or naysaying over the years, the school's authors mention the minimum wage in 1938 and later (Burns 1949, 68-82; 1963, 163; Bolling 1965, 199, 209; 1968, 136- (Bolling 1965, 208; 1968, 198-9) ; and medicare (Bolling 1968, 241) . 9 It is a substantial list.
Cause as well as pattern figured in the responsible parties claim. What might explain the spatial dissonance? It wasn't clear, but an industry bent to the task of explanation. Possibly the electoral college nudged the presidency in an urban direction (Burns 1963, 198, 252 A certain highlighting was going on in this responsible parties presentation. Alleged features of the system were singled out and pressed. The fourparties idea was a stretch. In hindsight, at least, apparently overblown, was the idea, often stated or implied, that a House oligarchy of the time was blocking the wishes of the chamber's median member. 10 There was localism-in a time sense. The school's gestalt of pattern and explanation looked important and at least plausible as it applied to, say, the late 1930s through the mid-1960s, but a telling application of it before or after that era would be harder. Still, taken as a claim, the responsible parties presentation was probably the chief analytic offering of the American political science discipline at the midpoint of the twentieth century, and it was ambitious and engaging.
Systems with norms and roles
A decade later, judging in terms of prominence and influence, came an abrupt, indeed sometimes haughtily dismissive, break with the responsible parties school. A "great generation" of congressional scholars came along, offering serious interview work on Capitol Hill-this was new-and a dedication to professional, as opposed to armchair or "literary," social science. 11 The new school's authors included Richard F. Fenno, Jr. (1962, 1966) , Ralph K. Huitt (1954, 1957, 1961) These authors lodged a trademark claim: the best way to understand Congress is to see it as a bounded "system," or a set of "subsystems," in which embedded "norms" or "roles" induce behavior. The theoretical borrowing was from sociology. 13 Abundant in the new school's writings were such terms as "function," "socialization," "adaptation," "differentiation," "integration," "autonomy," "institutionalization," "interdependence," and "system maintenance." In the Senate, Matthews (1960, ch. 5) detected a pattern of "folkways" that nurtured such behavior as specialization, courtesy, and reciprocity. White (1956, ch. 7), labeling that upper body a "citadel"-the ultimate in boundedness-found at its core an "inner club." 14 These various insights were not pointless. Aided by them, we could see better how Congress really worked. It did work, these authors argued. Thanks in part to the force of the system's norms and roles, goals could be achieved, problems could be solved, conflict could be managed, and duties could be performed (Fenno 1962, 310 It is no surprise that this generation's work, saturated as it was with interesting information, insights, and methodological innovations, has remained the gold standard in the study of Congress. Basic, enduring truths were laid out. Today's Senate, for example, given its encumbering rules, might come to a halt within twenty-four hours if it were not for some sense of comity shared by its members. Not to be lost in any view of Congress is that it is an organization, which means that it is laden with inner impulsions and connections that need to be witnessed and parsed close up to be appreciated. In a close-up inspection, they will be appreciated.
Still, there was highlighting in this school's message. For one thing, a congressional scholarship built on the experience of the late 1940s through the early 1960s, as this one was, might have emphasized other thingsfor example, the Senate's endless protection of the South's racial caste system through filibuster politics, or the parties' occasionally explosive drives to enact their legislative programs (the focus for the responsible parties writers). 15 Selection of what to look at was going on. Also, there was an ingredient of time localism. The school's interpretation matched the 1950s very nicely. Evolved into a crustacean perfection by then was Congress's seniority system (Polsby, Gallagher, and Rundquist 1969). The Keynesian synthesis, the waging of the Cold War, the demise of the far left around 1950, and the anesthetic calm administered by President Eisenhower, had tamped down the level of conflict that had been present in U.S. national politics previously, and would flare again in the late 1960s and 1970s. In hindsight, the 1950s was a kind of timeout. On the institutional side, certain features of Congress, given exquisite life by the systems school of the 1960s, would frazzle away in succeeding decades as partisan combat overtook Capitol Hill. By the time of Newt Gingrich and Nancy Pelosi, the House Appropriations and Ways and Means Committees, for example, would come to look different.
Purposive politicians
The 1970s brought a new theoretical claim: the best way to get a handle on Congress was to see its individual members as goal-seekers. Basically, they were that, it was argued. What's more, there were implications. Because the members were goal-seekers, they would organize their Capitol Hill structures and activities and generate public policy in corresponding ways. 16 Three authors, it is probably fair to say, set this scholarly course. Fenno again, reflecting an evolution in his thinking, led off a new work in 1973 with a chapter entitled "Member Goals," of which he saw three as fundamental to explanation: "reelection," "influence within the House," and "good public policy" (Fenno 1973, 1) . 17 Committee processes were thus illuminated. Morris P. Fiorina and David R. Mayhew built cases for accenting a single goal -reelection. Fiorina (1977) saw a "Washington establishment" cementing itself in place in the 1970s, thanks to members of Congress who created federal programs and then curried favor with voters through "fixit" services as those programs sprang bureaucratic leaks. 18 Mayhew (1974a, 5, 49-73, 125-38) posited members of Congressto be "single-minded seekers of reelection" who to that end engaged in "advertising," "credit claiming," and "position taking." Stemming from these practices, at the level of Congress as a whole, was said to be a pattern of "assembly coherence" marked by delay, particularism, servicing of the organized, and symbolism. This was a pure individualistic view of Congress that downplayed the political parties: "The fact is that no theoretical treatment of the United States Congress that posits parties as analytic units will go very far" (Mayhew 1974a, 27).
To view members of Congress as blinkered seekers of reelection was an obvious instance of theoretical highlighting. Indeed, Fenno's notion of multiple goals offered a kind of antidote to the idea. Also, in hindsight, the individualization of congressional politics in these "goals" theoriesat least the reelection theories-looks like a case of time localism. Where were the parties? 19 Their faint showing had reasons. On today's evidence, the early 1970s-the juncture when these theories were being hatchedstands out in a number of century-long time series as an all-time low in party conflict in the House of Representatives. Action that flouted party lines was peaking (Aldrich, Berger, and Rohde 2002, 23, 24, 27; Brady and Han 2006, 141, 142). Also, the late 1960s had brought a unique surge in the value of personal incumbency in House elections (Erikson 1971; Mayhew 1974b). Accordingly, as possibly never before, individual exertion was looking like the name of the game in congressional politics. One realm for that exertion was a record high in government programs crying out for corrective casework.
The "goals" theories arose and thrived in this 1970s context. This is not to say that their utility has fallen to zero since. Adding traction to the reelection account, R. Douglas Arnold (1990) has written of the "traceability" of the members' activities. "There they go again" was one possible reaction to the House's "cap and trade" energy bill of 2009, which began as a stern blueprint to raise revenue and auction off pollution permits, yet ended as more of a distributive subsidy measure leaner in revenue and blurrier in its incentive effects as specific districts and industries, including agriculture, had to be appeased. Thrusts toward symbolism (that is, a gap between label and content), particularism, and servicing of the organized, mushroomed as the need for 218 votes loomed. 20 It was a familiar performance.
The committees, the parties, the floor In the selection of claims I have discussed so far, there is a certain preSocratic texture. What is basically true? The universe is made of water, said Thales. No, the answer is air, said Anaximenes. Pythagoras opted for number. And so on. Similarly, the early scholarship about Congress brought a cascade of essentialism in what I have called the spatial dissonance, norms and rules, and purposive politicians schools. This cascade continued in a burst of creativity around 1990 as a generation of formal theorists put their ideas on the boards. This school could be approached as at least three distinct schools that each offered its own influential take on what is basically true. Yet there was a trademark commonality in intellectual origin and style, as well as a good deal of interlocking discussion, and, following a custom set by the school itself, I will take it up as a whole. 21 The "claim" treated in this section is thus actually a small family of claims prominently similar in DNA and some traits.
Look to the committees was the formulation of Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall (1988; see also Shepsle and Weingast 1987). As with Woodrow Wilson, those are the congressional nodes that best support theorizing. The committee system is "the formal expression of a comprehensive logrolling arrangement" (Fiorina 1987, 338 ) whereby the members of Congress, to serve their particular policy and reelection aims, award jurisdictional monopolies and agenda-setting edges to committees made up of policy advancers, as in agriculture and urban housing, and then profit through gains from exchange as those panels defer to each other on the floor. In this sense, the committees rule. No, argued Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins (1993 McCubbins ( , 2005 : look to the House majority party, not the committees. The majority party, crystallizing itself into a "cartel," wields committee appointments and floor agenda control so as to serve the electoral interests of its membership. "The party's reputation, based on its record, is a public good for all legislators in the party" ( 1993, 123). Among other things, "The more favorable is the majority party's record of legislative accomplishment, the better its reputation or brand name will be.…" (Cox and McCubbins 2005, 7) . Wrong on both counts, argued Keith Krehbiel. In back of the committees and parties, exercising at least remote control, is a legislative chamber's floor majority indexed by the stance of the median member. A "majoritarian postulate" pertains (Krehbiel 1992, [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] . The floor is sovereign. Majority parties if divided can be overridden. Committees exist to serve the informational needs of the floor, not the possibly sectoral needs of their own memberships-and, anyway, how much do those memberships really exhibit sectoral tilts?
There was plenty of highlighting in these formal presentations. That, in a sense, was their aim. An excellent guide to the various authors' possible overclaiming, so to speak, has been a stream of writing within the school itself. Vigorous criticism has been endogenous to the school. 22 Krehbiel has asked, for example (1992, 9-14,255): is it really true that the classic House Agriculture Committee could get its way by structuring proceedings on the floor? Cox and McCubbins have asked (2005, 89, 243-51): isn't our account of majority-party "rolls"-that is, instances where the bulk of the House majority party loses out in a final-passage roll call to a cross-party coalition-better than Krehbiel's? External criticism is possible, too. There are matters of emphasis. For example, as a statistical matter, Cox and McCubbins document that cross-party coalitions have not "rolled" the House majority party all that often. Yet in fact, when the publicity runs high, notably when the White House pushes its priorities, things can be different. 23 Think what the history of the last thirty years would look like, without the majorityparty "rolls" on the votes listed here in Ta b l e 38.1. Veteran followers of public affairs will find all these showdowns familiar. 24 In presiding over one of them-the funding of the Iraq War by a Democratic House in 2007-Nancy Pelosi commented, "I'm the Speaker of the House. … I have to take into consideration something broader than the majority of the majority in the Democratic Caucus" (Davis 2007, 1).
Time localism has also figured in certain offerings of the formal school. The committee theorizing looked backward. In the 1980s, as the new politics of multiple bill referrals and caucus selection of committee chairs played out, the grip of the House committees was fading. Marching to their own drums was getting tougher. The party theorizing, on the other hand, looked forward. factions, not one coherent party, but the analysis fit more surefootedly the oncoming age of Gingrich and Pelosi. 25 A signal contribution of the formal school was to offer a catechism of sharpness. There had been vagueness in congressional studies. Exactly what, here and there, was being argued for? How could we tell if it was right? The formalists brought a pioneering finesse in definition, theoretical workup, and evidence testing. Even the inconclusiveness of the school in addressing certain questions was an advance, since we could see better how to think about them. Regarding the history of the discipline, here might be an interesting class assignment for students steeped in the formalist writings: turn them loose on Wilson's Congressional Government with a directive to There has been a lot of sameness. There is a lot to be said for the fundamental importance of Constitutional structure.
Discussion
What does theorizing about Congress amount to? Novelty, breadth, bite, and credible insight need to figure in the mix-that we could all agree on-but so does simplification. Yet simplification entails "highlighting," which in turn brings on empirical vulnerability. Yet such vulnerability can be productive if it spurs a continuing conversation of empirical testing and counter-theorizing. This seems to be the way things work. Of great importance is a tradition of stern empirical testing that keeps the tires getting kicked.
There is nothing surprising in this argument. A bit more surprising, perhaps, is the case I have made for the persistence of time localism in theorizing about Congress. It is a weed that will not go away. We tend not to see it as clearly as we might because we live in the present, think in the present, and write books and articles in the present. There is nothing particularly culpable in this localism tendency. I would guess all the social sciences exhibit a pretty clear pattern of time localism in the ways they go about theorizing. Yes, it might be wise for us to step back and think a bit more than we ordinarily do before launching that new theory. Is it really as timeless as its label says? But, on the record, the grip of this advice is likely to have limits. It is an ontological matter. Time localism, to some degree anyway, is probably baked into the nature of the theoretical trade. Like highlighting, it stays with us. 
